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I. INTRODUCTION 
Grotian Moment is a term that signifies a "paradigm-shifting 
development in which new rules and doctrines of customary international 
law emerge with unusual rapidity and acceptance."1 A Grotian Moment is 
thus "an instance in which a fundamental change in the exiting international 
system happens, thereby provoking the emergence of a new principle of 
customary law with outstanding speed."2 Professor Richard Falk invented 
the term Grotian Moment in 1985. Since then, the term has been employed 
by experts in a variety of ways.3 Here, I will adopt the following meaning 
of Grotian Moment as proposed by Professor Michael Scharf: "a 
transformative development in which new rules and doctrines of customary 
international law emerge with unusual rapidity and acceptance. ,..i This 
article will examine whether the concept of humanitarian intervention, 
developed over the past two decades, constitutes an instance of a Grotian 
Moment. In particular, this article will focus on Syria and the recent 
arguments in favor of humanitarian intervention in this region, and will 
pose the question of whether Syria constitutes a law-creating moment. This 
article will conclude that Syria may contribute to the shaping of a new 
Grotian Moment: the development of humanitarian intervention as a norm 
of customary law. 
• The Charles R. Emrick Jr.-Calfee Halter & Griswold Professor of Law, Cleveland-
Marshall College of Law. The author would like to thank the organizers of the 2013 International Law 
Weekend for the opportunity to present these remarks. 
I. Michael P. Scharf, Seizing the "Grotian Moment" Accelerated Formation of Customary 
Int'/ Law in Time ofFundamental Change, 43 CORNELL INT'L L. J. 439, 439 (2010). 
2. Milena Sterio, A Grotian Moment: Changes in the Legal Theory ofStatehood, 39 DENV. 
J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 209, 211 (2011). 
3. Id. 
4. Scharf, supra note I, at 444. 
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II. WHAT IS A GROTIAN MOMENT? 
The term "Grotian" refers to Dutch scholar Hugo Grotius (1583­
1645), who is hailed as the father of modem international law, and who, in 
his seminal work, De Jure Belli ac Pacis (The Law of War and Peace), 
"offered a new concept of international law designed to reflect that new 
reality."5 Similar to how Grotius developed a novel understanding of 
international law in the seventeenth century, more modem events have 
constituted Grotian Moments over the last several decades. Thus, 
commentators have suggested that the creation of the Nuremberg Tribunal 
at the end of World War II was a Grotian Moment.6 Moreover, the 
establishment of the United Nations (U.N.) Charter could constitute another 
example of a Grotian Moment.7 Finally, the recent establishment of the 
International Criminal Court could provide an additional instance of a 
Grotian Moment. 8 
Over time, scholars have used other terms to convey the idea of a 
Grotian Moment. Professors Bruce Ackerman, Bardo Fassbender, Jenny 
Martinez, Leila Sadat, Anne-Marie Slaughter, and William Burke-White 
have all used the term "constitutional moment" to refer to different 
developments in American constitutional law and in international law.9 
The term "international constitutional moment" may be distinguished from 
the concept of Grotian Moment as the latter reflects a wider-ranging 
5. Id. at 443; see generally Hugo Grotius, The Law of War and Peace, LoNANG.COM (May 
2012), http://www.lonang.com/exlibris/grotius (last visited Jan. 31, 2014). 
6. See generally Ibrahim J. Gassama, International Law at a Grotian Moment: The Invasion 
ofIraq in Context, 18 EMORY INT'L L. REV. I, 9 (2004) (arguing that along the Peace of Westphalia, the 
Nuremberg Charter and the U.N. Charter include more recent Grotian moments). 
7. Id. 
8. Leila Nadya Sadat, The New International Criminal Court: An Uneasy Revolution, 88 
GEO. L. J. 381, 474 (2000). 
9. See generally BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, RECONSTRUCTING AMERICAN LAW (1984) (referring 
to the New Deal era as a "constitutional moment"); Bardo Fassbender, The United Nations Charter as 
Constitution of the International Community, 36 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 529 (1998); Jenny S. 
Martinez, Towards an International Judicial System, 56 STAN. L. REV. 429, 463 (2003) (referring to the 
drafting of the U.N. Charter as a "constitutional moment" in the history of international law); Leila 
Nadya Sadat, Enemy Combatants After Hamdan v. Rumsfeld: Extraordinary Rendition, Torture, and 
Other Nightmares from the War on Terror, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1200, 1206--07 (2007) (referring to 
Nuremberg as a "constitutional moment"); Anne-Marie Slaughter & William Burke-White, An 
International Constitutional Moment, 43 HARV. INT'L L.J. I, 2 (2002) (referring to 9/11 as a 
"constitutional moment" and arguing that the attacks reflect a change in the nature of threats facing the 
international community, justifying the development of new rules of customary law). 
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development affecting international law on the whole, and not merely 
subfields of international law. 10 
Finally, the notion of a Grotian Moment can also be distinguished 
from the concept of "instant customary international law."11 This theory 
argues that state practice may not be a necessary element in the 
establishment and creation of customary law if states' opinio juris on an 
emerging norm can be clearly demonstrated through their General 
Assembly resolutions. 12 On the contrary, customary international law is 
formed through gradual, widespread, and lengthy state practice and a sense 
of legal obligation to comply with the emerging norm. 13 Thus, the process 
of establishing such a norm of customary international law can take many 
decades or even centuries. 14 The Grotian Moment theory is distinct from 
the theory of instant customary law because it looks beyond General 
Assembly resolutions and focuses on paradigmatic changes in international 
law caused by rapid and profound global developments. 
The "Grotian Moment" concept contemplates accelerated formation of 
customary international law through widespread acquiescence or 
endorsement in response to State acts, rather than instant custom based 
solely on General Assembly resolutions. 15 The Grotian Moment theory 
may rely on General Assembly resolutions to discover evidence of an 
emerging customary law norm, resulting from a period of fundamental 
change. However, General Assembly resolutions are one of the many tools 
utilized by scholars discovering a Grotian Moment. 
[T]he "Grotian Moment" concept may be helpful to a court 
examining whether a particular General Assembly resolution 
should be deemed evidence of an embryonic rule of customary 
international law, especially in a case lacking the traditional level 
10. Scharf, supra note 1, at 445 (describing that a Grotian Moment "makes more sense when 
speaking ofa development that has an effect on international law at large"). 
11. Sterio, supra note 2, at 212 (citing PETER MALANCZUK, AKEHURST'S MODERN 
INTRODUCTION To lNT'L LAW 45-46 (7th ed. 1997); B. Cheng, United National Resolutions on Outer 
Space: "Instant" International Customary Law?, 5 INDIAN J. INT'L L. 23 (1965)); Jeremy Levitt, 
Humanitarian Intervention by Regional Actors in Internal Conflicts: The Cases ofECOWAS in Liberia 
and Sierra Leone, 12 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 333, 351 (1998): see generally Benjamin Lengille, It's 
"Instant Custom:" How the Bush Doctrine Became Law After the Te"orist Attacks ofSeptember 11, 
2001, 26 B.C. lNT'L & COMP. L. REV. 145 (2003). 
12. Cheng, supra note 11, at 36. 
13. Scharf, supra note 1, at 445. 
14. See e.g., The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900) (The U.S. Supreme Court 
recognized in this case that the process of forming customary international law can take centuries.). 
15. Scharf, supra note 1, at 446. 
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of widespread and repeated state practice. In periods of 
fundamental change-whether by technological advances, the 
commission of new forms of crimes against humanity, or the 
development of new means of warfare or terrorism-rapidly 
developing customary international law as crystallized in General 
Assembly resolutions may be necessary for international law to 
keep up with the pace of other developments. 16 
As mentioned above, historical examples of Grotian Moments include 
the creation of the Nuremberg Tribunal at the end of World War II, as well 
as the establishment of the U.N. in 1945.17 More recent examples include 
the creation of the International Criminal Court.18 Additionally, the 
terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon on September 11, 
2001 have significantly impacted the international community's 
understanding of the laws of war. 19 In the wake of the September 11 
attacks, Security Council adopted Resolution 1368, which confirmed the 
right to use force in self-defense against non-state actors (al-Qaeda), 
thereby confirming the idea that international law authorizes states to use 
force in self-defense against non-state actors.20 
A lesser known Grotian Moment may consist of the situation when the 
United States and Soviet Union initially "developed the ability to launch 
rockets into outer space and place satellites in earth orbit."21 Responding to 
this development, the U.N. General Assembly adopted Declaration of Legal 
Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of 
Outer Space, which confirmed that the U.N. Charter generally applies to 
outer space, as well as attempted to limit states' ability to lay territorial 
claims to parts of outer space.22 This Declaration was widely accepted as 
16. Scharf, supra note I, at 450. 
17. Sterio, supra note 2, at 2011-12. 
18. See generally supra notes 6-8 and accompanying text. 
19. See e.g .• British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw, Order out of Chaos: The Future of 
Afghanistan, Address at the International Institute of Strategic Studies (Oct. 22, 2001), quoted in 
Slaughter, Burke-White, supra note 9, at 2 (According to then British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw, 
"[f]ew events in global history can have galvanized the international system to action so completely in 
so short a time."). 
20. See generally U.N. SCOR, 56th Sess., 4370th mtg, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1368 (2001) (Calling 
on states to "work together urgently to bring to justice the pi:rpetrators, organizers and sponsors" of the 
attacks, and reaffirming the inherent right of self-defense in accordance with Article 51 of the U.N. 
Charter, in the ~ontext of the 9/1 I terrorist attacks.). 
2 I. Scharf, supra note I, at 450. 
22. See generally Declaration of Legal Principles Governing the Activities of States in the 
Exploration and Use of Outer Space, G.A. Res. 1962 (XVIII), 1280th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. 
AIRES/1962 (Dec. 13 1963). 
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law and reflected a time of change caused by accelerated technological 
developments, such as the possibility to launch rockets into outer space.23 
Finally, the development of humanitarian intervention at the very end 
of the twentieth century has been described as a Grotian Moment.24 In 
1999, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) forces intervened in 
Serbia to protect ethnic Kosovar Albanians from ethnic cleansing, instituted 
by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia government.25 The NATO 
campaign had not been authorized by the U.N., but the global consensus on 
this intervention was that it was "[unlawful] but legitimate."26 The 
international community responded to the intervention through a new 
doctrine called "Responsibility to Protect," which authorizes humanitarian 
interventions in limited circumstances.27 A growing number of scholars 
have agreed that humanitarian intervention has become an emerging norm 
of customary international law, and that it ought to be recognized in some 
extraordinary circumstances.28 Thus, the notion of humanitarian 
intervention may have constituted a Grotian Moment. This is particularly 
relevant today in the context of Syria and the ongoing humanitarian crisis, 
which has sparked significant debate over the issue of humanitarian 
intervention. 
23. See Sterio, supra note 2, at 214. 
24. See Scharf, supra note 1, at 450. 
25. Milena Sterio, On the Right to External Self-Determination: "Se/jistans, "Secession, and 
the Great Powers' Rule, 19 MINN. J. INT'L L. 137, 163--M (2010). 
26. This terminology was coined by the drafters of the Kosovo Report. See INDEP. INT'L 
COMM'N ON Kosovo, Kosovo REPORT: CONFLICT, INT'L RESPONSE, LESSONS LEARNED, ch. 6 (2000) 
[hereinafter Kosovo COMM'N]. The position of the U.S. Government confirmed this view; a few days 
before the start of the NATO-led aerial strikes against the former Yugoslavia in 1999, a spokesman from 
the U.S. State Department stated that "[w]e and our NATO allies have looked to numerous factors in 
concluding that such action, if necessary, would be justified ...." And that "we and our NATO allies 
believe there are legitimate grounds to threaten and, if necessary, use military force." Sean Murphy, 
Contemporary Practice ofthe United States Relating to Int'/ Law, 93 AM. J. lNT'L L. 628, 631 (1999); 
but see the position of the United Kingdom's Government: "We are in doubt that NATO is acting 
within international law and our legal justification rests upon the accepted principle that force may be 
used in extreme circumstances to avert a humanitarian catastrophe." DUKE, EHRHART & KARADI, The 
Major European Allies: France, Germany, and the United Kingdom, in Kosovo AND THE CHALLENGE 
OF HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION 128 (Schnabel & Thakur eds., 2000) [hereinafter Kosovo AND THE 
CHALLENGE]. 
27. See generally THE lNT'L COMMISSION ON INTERVENTION AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY, THE 
RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT (2001), available at http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/ 
IC1SS%20Report.pdf (last visited Feb. 22, 2014) [hereinafter ICISS REPORT]; see also Max W. 
Mathews, Note, Tracking the Emergence ofa New Int 'I Norm: The Responsibility to Protect and the 
Crisis in Darfur, 31 B.C. INT'L COMP. L. REV. 137 (2008). 
28. See John Alan Cohan, Sovereignty in a Postsovereign World, 18 FLA. J. INT'L L. 907, 941 
(2006); MARC WELLER, ARMED SAMARITANS 20-22 (Counsel 1999). 
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III. SYRIA: A VIOLENT PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE? 
Syria is a multi-ethnic nation, home to a majority of Arab Sunnis and 
many other minority groups such as Arab Alawites, Christians, Armenians, 
Assyrians, Droze, Kurds, and Turks.29 It was a part of the Ottoman Empire 
from the 16th century until World War I.30 After the War Syria was 
integrated into the French mandate in the Middle East.31 It gained 
independence from France in 1946, but its first decades as a sovereign 
nation were marred by violence and conflict.32 Following a regional war in 
1970, Hafez al-Assad, current President Assad's father, rose to power and 
emerged as ruler of Syria.33 Violence and warfare ensued throughout Hafez 
al-Assad's regime. In the late 1970s, an Islamic uprising orchestrated by 
the Muslim Brotherhood and aimed against the government resulted in 
further violence, culminating in the 1982 Rama Massacre, where tens of 
thousands of Syrians were killed by the Syrian army.34 Hafez al-Assad died 
in 2000 and was replaced by his son, Bashar al-Assad, who ran unopposed 
for the presidential post.35 
Bashar al-Assad's election initially sparked hope for reform, but his 
regime quickly quashed any protest.36 The current crisis began as part of 
the Arab Spring: A series of peaceful protests that took place in Syria in 
the spring of 2011, to be brutally quashed by the Syrian army.37 By the 
summer of 2011, army defectors formed the Free Syrian Army and began 
fighting against government forces. The opposition movement is 
dominated by Sunnis, whereas Assad and the governing regime are mostly 
Alawites.38 According to some reports, as many as 100,000 people have 
been killed in this bloody conflict, whereas over 1.5 million Syrians have 
29. See Syria Profile, BBC NEWS MIDDLE EAST (Dec. 12, 2013), http://www.bbc.eo.uk/ 
news/world-middle-east-14703856 (last visited Feb. 22, 2014) (hereinafter Syria Profile]. 
30. Id. 
31. Id. 
32. Id. 
33. Id. 
34. See Syria Profile, supra note 29. 
35. Id. 
36. Id. ("Following the death of Hafez al-Assad in 2000 Syria underwent a brief period of 
relaxation. Hundreds of political prisoners were released, but real political freedoms and a shake-up of 
the state-dominated economy never materialized."). 
37. See generally id. 
38. Kim Sengupta, Syria's Sectarian War Goes Int'/ as Foreign Fighters and Arms Pour Into 
Country, INDEPDENDENT.CO.UK (Feb. 20, 2012), http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle­
east/syrias-sectarian-war-goes-intemational-as-foreign-fighters-and-arms-pour-into-country­
7216665.html (last visited Jan. 31, 2014). 
2014] Sterio 349 
fled to the neighboring countries of Jordan, Turkey, Iraq, and Lebanon. 39 
Recently, the conflict escalated resulting in the use of particularly heinous 
weapons by the Syrian government. In August 2013, President Assad 
allegedly used chemical weapons against Syrian civilians; as confirmed by 
UN . 40. . mspectors. 
The ongoing crisis situates itself perfectly within the ongoing situation 
in Syria, where all constitutional and democratic freedoms and values have 
been lacking. While Syria is officially a constitutional democracy, all 
constitutional freedoms were suspended between 1963 and 2011 under an 
Emergency Law, because of the ongoing conflict with Israel over Golan 
Heights.41 Most human rights observers have expressed serious concern 
over Syria's human rights record, calling it one of the worst on the planet.42 
The current conflict has only exacerbated an already volatile situation. 
Syrian demographics have additionally fueled the ongoing conflict. A 
majority of Syrians (approximately 60%) are Sunni Arab; President Assad 
and his government belong to a minority Alawite group (approximately 
12%); Christians constitute a 10% minority; other minority groups such as 
Turks, Kurds, and Assyrians constitute the remaining 18% of the 
population.43 Christians have aligned themselves with the ruling Alawites, 
from whom they have expected protection from the more radical Islamic 
Sunnis. Many Christians, alongside Alawites, hold prominent posts within 
Syria.44 Most Christians have thus supported Assad throughout the conflict 
39. Matthew Weaver, Syria Crisis: Number of Refugees Tops 1.5 Million, Says UN, THE 
GUARDIAN (May 16, 2003), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/may/16/syria-crisis-refugees­
million-un (last visited Jan. 31, 2014). 
40. Syria Chemical Attack: What We Know, BBC NEWS (Sept. 24, 2013), 
http://www.bbc.eo.uk/news/world-middle-east-23927399 (last visited Feb. 20, 2014); see also Report of 
the United Nations Mission to Investigate Allegations of the Use of Chemical Weapons in the Syrian 
Arab Republic on the Alleged Use of Chemical Weapons in the Ghouta Area of Damascus, Aug. 21, 
2013, U.N. Doc. A/67/997-S/2013/553, available at http://www.un.org/disannament/content/ 
slideshow/Secretary _General_ Report_ of_ CW_ Investigation.pdf (last visited Feb. 20, 2014). 
41. Syria's Emergency Law Lifted After 48 Years, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA BLOG (Apr. 
19, 2011), http://www.britannica.com/blogs/2011/04/syrias-emergency-law-lifted-48-years-editor (last 
visited Feb. 20, 2014). 
42. See Freedom in the World 2011, FREEDOMHOUSE.ORG (2011), 
http://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/freedom-world­
2011 ?page=363&year=201 l&country=8143 (last visited Feb. 20, 2014). 
43. Syria Demographics Profile 2013, INDEXMUNDI.COM (2013), 
http:l/www.indexmundi.com/syria/demographics_profile.html (last visited Jan. 31, 2014) (citing CIA 
WORLD FACTBOOK). 
44. Syria's Christians Stand by Assad, CBS NEWS (Feb. 6, 2002), http://www.cbsnews.com/ 
8301-503543 _ l 62-5 737217 5-503543/syrias-christians-stand-by-assad/ (last visited Feb. 20, 2014) 
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and have argued that if Assad were removed, the dominant Sunnis would 
install an Islamic-extremist government which would harm Christians and 
all other minority groups even further.45 The presence of multiple ethnic 
groups in Syria, as well as their mutual alliances and skirmishes, have 
contributed to historical instability of the Syrian state and have exacerbated 
the present-day civil war. 
In the wake of horrific violence and bloodshed in Syria, and in 
particular, the allegations of chemical weapons used by the Assad regime, 
the international community has grappled with the issue of whether to 
intervene with military in this volatile region. The U.N. Security Council 
has been blocked over the issue because both Russia and China have 
threatened to veto any resolution calling for military action against Syria.46 
The United States briefly attempted to build consensus over the idea of 
staging a unilateral intervention in Syria, alongside allies such as Great 
Britain and France.47 The section below will explore the issue of 
humanitarian intervention post-Syria, and whether this emerging norm 
constitutes a Grotian Moment. 
IV. A NEW GROTIAN MOMENT: HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION? 
Any unilateral military action against Syria exercised without Security 
Council approval constitutes a use of force that can be best justified through 
the paradigm of humanitarian intervention: This concept is an emerging 
norm of customary law that is currently being crystallized into binding law. 
The creation of any norm of customary law requires two elements: opinio 
juris and state practice.48 State action and practice aimed at the creation of 
a new norm of customary law may in fact break an existing norm. In other 
words, states may have to engage in behavior which purposely violates 
existing rules in order to create new, presumably better rules. For the 
("Thousands of Christians are tied up in the regime's security apparatus and are employed in high­
ranking government and military positions."). 
45. Id. ("As a fellow minority, Christians have long supported the Alawite regime in order to 
ensure protection and rights for themselves."). 
46. Louis Charbonneau & Michelle Nichols, U.N. Security Council Powers Meet Again on 
Syria; No Outcome, REUTERS (Aug. 29, 2013), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/08/29/us-syria­
crisis-un-idUSBRE97Sl7R20130829 (last visited Jan. 31, 2014) (noting that Russia and China had 
vetoed three proposed resolutions that would have condemned the Assad regime and threatened United 
Nations sanctions). 
47. Id. (noting that the United States and Great Britain sought to convince the public for the 
need to engage in military strikes against Syria); see also France's Hollande Backs U.S. on Syria 
Action, BBC NEWS (Aug. 30, 2013), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-23897775 (last 
visited Feb. 20, 2014). 
48. See Scharf, supra note l, at 445. 
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purposes of Syria, this implies that states may have to engage in military 
intervention for a humanitarian purpose without Security Council approval, 
thereby breaking the existing ban on the use of force in order to establish a 
new customary norm of humanitarian intervention. 
In the context of Syria, the argument in favor of humanitarian 
intervention is solid. In the words of Harold Koh, "Syria is a lawmaking 
moment" because all the conditions seem to be met for the advancement of 
a novel legal argument: that humanitarian intervention has crystallized into 
a new binding norm of international law.49 Thus, the emergence of 
humanitarian intervention as a new norm of customary law, as evidenced 
post-Syria, may constitute a Grotian Moment, similar to those described 
above. According to Koh, humanitarian intervention could be legal under 
international law if the following conditions were met: 
1) 	 If a humanitarian crisis creates consequences significantly 
disruptive ofinternational order-including proliferation of 
chemical weapons, massive refugee outflows, and events 
destabilizing to regional peace and security of the region­
that would likely soon create an imminent threat to the 
acting nations (which would give rise to an urgent need to 
act in individual and collective self-defense under Article 
51); 
2) 	 [A] Security Council resolution was not available because 
of persistent veto; and the group of nations that had 
persistently sought Security Council action had exhausted 
all other remedies reasonably available under the 
circumstances, they would not violate U.N. Charter Article 
2(4) if they used[ ...] 
3) 	 [L]imited force for genuinely humanitarian purposes that 
was necessary and proportionate to address the imminent 
threat would demonstrably improve the humanitarian 
situation, and would terminate as soon as the threat is 
abated.50 
Over the past few decades, humanitarian intervention has grown from 
a hawkish argument, advanced by few, to a powerfully emerging norm of 
customary law. Evidence to support the emergence of this norm cannot be 
ignored; moreover, the emergence of such a norm is a necessity in today's 
type of warfare: where conflict is more often intra-state than inter-state, 
49. See Harold Hongju Koh, Syria and the Law ofHumanitarian Intervention (Part I!: Int'/ 
Law and the Way Forward), JUSTSECURITY.ORG (Oct. 2, 2013, 9:00 AM), http://justsecurity.org/2013/ 
10/02/koh-syria-part2/ (last visited Feb. 20, 2014). 
50. Id. (emphasis in original). 
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and where civilians represent targets more frequently than soldiers. First, 
both opinio juris and state practice have slowly been turning toward 
approval of humanitarian intervention as a new norm of customary law. In 
the context of Kosovo in 1999, many states were ready and willing to 
participate in a NATO-led military intervention, outside of the confines of 
the U.N. Charter. While some states, including the United States, attempted 
to paint this intervention as sui generis and not precedent-creating, others 
more openly admitted to their belief that this type of action was indeed 
justified under international law.51 
Moreover, even states which denied that Kosovo was any type of a 
new precedent-setting norm nonetheless participated in this military 
intervention. State practice in the case of Kosovo points to the emergence 
of a new norm of customary law, namely humanitarian intervention. As the 
Independent International Commission on Kosovo pointed out, "[t]he 
Kosovo 'exception' now exists, for better and worse, as a contested 
precedent that must be assessed in relation to a wide range of international 
effects and undertakings."52 In addition, then U.N. Secretary-General Kofi 
Annan has claimed, in the aftermath of Kosovo, that "[ e ]merging slowly, 
but I believe surely, is an international norm against the violent repression 
of minorities that will and must take precedence over concerns of State 
sovereignty."53 Other examples of humanitarian intervention over the 
course of the last two decades include a 1999 intervention on behalf of the 
Kurds staged by the United States and exercised against Iraq, as well as the 
2012 intervention in Libya.54 In addition to such examples of humanitarian 
51. Compare the United Kingdom's position on Kosovo, arguing that the NATO intervention 
was legal under international law, with the position of the United States, which argued that the 
intervention was "legitimate." See FREEDOM HOUSE, supra note 42; see also Kosovo COMMISSION, 
supra note 26. 
52. Kosovo COMMISSION, supra note 26, at 175. 
53. See Press Release, Human Rights Commission, Secretary-General Calls for Renewed 
Commitment in New Century to Protect Rights of Man, Woman, Child-Regardless of Ethnic, National 
Belonging, U.N. Press Release SG/SM/6949, HR/CN/898 (Apr. 7, 1999). 
54. Sterio, supra note 25, at 156 (discussing the 1991 intervention on behalf of the Kurds). 
While military intervention in Libya had been authorized through Security Council Resolution 1973, the 
action itself was exercised by a coalition of nineteen states and involvement by NATO. Although Libya 
does not represent an instance of humanitarian intervention absent Security Council authorization, it 
does illustrate the willingness of multiple states to participate in a military intervention to protect 
civilians from humanitarian suffering. See e.g., Qatar, Several EU States Up for Libya Action: 
Diplomat, EUBUSINESS.COM (Mar. 19, 2011 ), http://www.eubusiness.com/news-eu/libya-unrest­
summit.95v/ (last visited Feb. 20, 2014); see also Libya Example Shows UN Resolution on Syria Might 
be Used to Justify Broad Intervention, RT.COM (Sept. 24, 2013), http://rt.com/op-edge/libya-un-broad­
intervention-277/ (last visited Feb. 20, 2014) (noting that Resolution 1973 ''was presented as a 
humanitarian resolution"). 
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intervention, the international community has grappled with this issue and 
many states have indicated their willingness to develop a new norm 
authorizing military action against rogue regimes. 
Many such discussions have already occurred within the context of 
responsibility to protect. While the existing document on responsibility to 
protect places any military intervention within the purview of the Security 
Council, many states' willingness to debate this issue and to question the 
Security Council's monopoly in this area demonstrates an emergence or 
crystallization of a new way of thinking. Humanitarian intervention has 
been present in the public discussions of many states and on the agenda of 
the U.N. General Assembly. The absence of consensus on this issue does 
not demonstrate that states do not wish to develop a new normative 
framework for humanitarian intervention; however, such lack of consensus 
indicates that states take this issue very seriously and may be in the process 
of cooperating toward the development of a new norm. Second, modern­
day warfare necessitates the development of a new norm authorizing 
military intervention in situations where the Security Council is deadlocked 
and where humanitarian suffering becomes intolerable. Most recent wars 
have been internal and have involved large civilian populations.55 
Unfortunately, Security Council politics have resulted in multiple vetoes 
and only a small number of military actions have ever been authorized. 
Civilian populations need the international community's protection, and 
such protection can only be offered if a normative framework for true 
humanitarian intervention is developed. Syria may be the perfect 
opportunity to do so. The framework mentioned above, proposed by 
Harold Koh in the context of Syria, accomplishes the important task of 
legalizing humanitarian intervention under very strict, limited 
circumstances. This type of limited humanitarian intervention may 
constitute a new Grotian Moment. 
Koh is correct in developing and advancing the argument in favor of 
humanitarian intervention. Customary norms of law emerge through novel 
legal arguments, and through states' acceptance and usage of such 
arguments. The only way that humanitarian intervention can develop into a 
binding norm of customary law is through the writing of scholars like Koh, 
which can then be espoused by political leaders and put into frequent use. I 
also agree with Koh that humanitarian intervention is a necessity in today's 
world-because, like in Syria, modern-day conflicts often remain within a 
single state's boundary and often cause tremendous humanitarian suffering. 
55. See e.g., James Mayall, The Concept ofHumanitarian Intervention Revisited, in Kosovo 
AND THE CHALLENGE, supra note 26, at 320 (noting that since the Gulf War, the majority of conflict 
were intrastate conflicts, necessitating U.N. Chapter VI intervention to provide humanitarian relief as 
well as peacekeeping functions). 
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Because Security Council remains deadlocked over geo-political interests 
of its permanent members, it is essential that the international community 
become enabled to act without its explicit approval. The hope here is that 
humanitarian intervention can someday morph from an emerging norm of 
international law into a binding one. That customary law will evolve and 
will embrace this new norm. That the Security Council structure of veto 
power can be overcome one day through such development of binding 
custom, and that we will witness the creation of a new Grotian Moment. 
The emergence of a new customary norm of international law, and the 
creation of a new Grotian Moment, is of course a difficult proposition. 
How does one "prove" that customary law contains a new norm? How 
does one demonstrate the exact content of that norm? Academics, 
politicians, judges, and arbitrators have already grappled with the idea of 
proving the existence and content of a customary law norm. They have 
looked to the traditional sources of international law: Treaties, writings of 
scholars, judicial opinions, and general principles of law. They have 
reviewed U.N. sources, such as Security Council and General Assembly 
resolutions, soft law instruments, such as codes of conduct, guidelines, 
gentlemen's agreements, and various political statements. They have 
browsed through supporting and interpretative documents, such as travaux 
preparatoires, legislative history behind national statutes, and drafting 
history and drafters' statements linked to any international document. 
Anyone looking for the emergence of a new customary norm of 
humanitarian intervention would look in similar places. It is thus important 
that the proposed framework for the legality of humanitarian intervention 
become a part of international legal discourse. That it continue to be 
discussed at academic forums and conferences. That it remain a subject of 
controversy on the Security Council and General Assembly agenda, and 
that it persist to occupy a sore subject of political and diplomatic 
negotiation. The development of any new legal rule requires tenacity and 
persistence. Developing a legal framework for humanitarian intervention 
will similarly require significant effort; it is too important of a task however 
to justify giving up. With persistence and tenacity by states, scholars, and 
courts eager to develop a new norm of humanitarian intervention, we may 
soon become able to observe another fully-shaped Grotian Moment. 
Last, I understand that humanitarian intervention can be a slippery 
slope-that states may attempt to misuse this rationale to justify aggressive 
military action and the use of force for selfish, national interests under the 
guise of humanitarian assistance. But any law can be potentially misused, 
misinterpreted, or wrongly applied. This is not an argument in favor of 
doing nothing. At best, it is an argument in favor of adding to Koh's 
proposed framework. One such addition may be a requirement that any 
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state engaged in a unilateral humanitarian intervention report back to the 
Security Council. Such a reporting mechanism already exists within the 
U.N. Charter for the exercise of self-defense; it would be equally valid for 
the humanitarian intervention paradigm. 
Another addition may be a requirement that a state considering the use 
of force for humanitarian purposes attempt to build an international 
coalition. Although the Security Council may be paralyzed, it would 
nonetheless be possible for the intervener state to seek allies. The United 
States attempted to do so when it first considered the possibility of using 
force against Syria-President Obama sought British and French 
assistance.56 The Bush Administration's response to the 9/11 terrorist 
attacks also centered on building an international coalition of states willing 
to combat terrorism. 57 And the Kosovo air strikes, conducted with a 
humanitarian goal, were led by a NATO coalition of states.58 The existence 
of an international alliance in most instances demonstrates that multiple 
states are concerned with a given situation and that multiple states consider 
the use of force appropriate. The requirement that states build or attempt to 
build an international coalition any time they wish to engage in 
humanitarian intervention could prevent individual states from staging 
military actions with non-humanitarian goals under the pretext of 
humanitarian intervention. 
Finally, it should be noted that international law is not stagnant and 
that it has evolved and changed drastically over the past century. Thus, if 
some day humanitarian intervention becomes an unnecessary, ill-used, 
cumbersome norm, international law players can act in order to change the 
norm. If rogue states misuse the norm and engage in reprehensible military 
actions under the pretense of humanitarian assistance, the international 
community can reevaluate and reinterpret the norm, or can pass treaty 
provisions to overturn the norm. International law has evolved because of 
changes in our society and the need to preserve international peace and 
security in a different manner. Similarly, international law can change in 
the future, to respond to distinct future needs ofour global community. 
56. Syria Demographics Profile, supra note 43; see also Charbonneau & Nichols supra, note 
46. 
57. Sarah Anderson, Phyllis Bennis & John Cavanagh, Coalition ofthe Willing or Coalition of 
the Coerced?, INSTITUTE FOR POLICY STUDIES (Feb. 8, 2014), http://www.ips­
dc.org/reports/coalition_of_the_willing (last visited Feb. 20, 2014) (describing the building of the 
Coalition of the Willing by the Bush Administration in the wake of9/l l). 
58. See e.g., Sterio, supra note 25, at 156 (discussing the NATO air strikes against the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia aimed at protecting Kosovar Albanians). 
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V. CONCLUSION 
As scholars have acknowledged, "[c]ommentator's and courts should 
exercise caution, however, in characterizing situations as Grotian 
Moments" as most instances of profound change may need to be more 
strictly scrutinized to determine if they truly qualify as Grotian Moments. 59 
While the issue of humanitarian intervention certainly merits continuous 
attention and scrutiny on behalf of states, scholars, and courts, the 
development of this new norm of international law authorizing the use of 
force toward the goal of preventing humanitarian suffering would be a 
significant and worthy Grotian Moment. In the wake of the Syrian 
situation, we may be witnessing the development and creation of a new 
Grotian Moment: the emergence of a customary norm of international law 
authorizing humanitarian intervention. 
59. Scharf, supra note I, at 452. 
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